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NOTES
THE COURT OF CLAIMS ACT IN ILLINOIS
Illinois needs a Court of Claims Act which will provide recovery for tort
claimants. This fact is indicated by an examination of the actual accountability

of state agencies in Illinois for injuries inflicted by officials and employees.
There are, of course, existent acts which deal with different aspects of liability.
However, a practical study cannot ignore the erratic functioning of the "court
of claims," nor the unsatisfactory working of the present law of state and
municipal liability. As a consequence, existing legislation is inadequate in its
modification of the common law of state responsibility.
A comparison of "state tort"' responsibility in Illinois and New York not
only reveals the confused situation in Illinois resulting from domination of the
rule of state immunity, but emphasizes the advantages of New York's policy
of state accountability. State immunity to suit is axiomatic in the common
law.2 One consequence of the rule of immunity is the inapplicability of the doctrine of respondeatsuperiorwhen an officer or an employee of the state commits
a tort in the performance of his duties. The only redress available to the injured
In legal language the term "tort" is usually applied only to invasions of personality and
property by individuals and private corporations. The application of this term in the law of
state responsibility must be made with caution.
aFreund, Responsibility of the State in Internal (Municipal) Law, 9 Tulane L. Rev. I
(1934).
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party is an appeal to the legislature for a special appropriation,3 or a personal
suit against the tortfeasor. Financial inability of public employees and officials
frequently results in an undue hardship to the victim of the tort.4 Redress by
legislative appeal suggests the baneful consequences of political influences and
pressures, the failure to develop well-defined and consistent rules with regard
to the making of appropriations, and the overburdening of the legislature with
a multitude of claims the determination of which really requires judicial facilities. This state of the law has resulted in a barrage of vigorous criticism, in
which commentators have emphasized strong practical justifications as well as
the consonance of state responsibility with modern social, legal and political
theories.S
This constantly increasing criticism has resulted in some increase of state
tort responsibility by legislative action in the federal government and in some
of the states, 7 especially New York.8 The advance, however, has been greatly
impeded by the courts and other tribunals entrusted with the enforcement of
such statutes. Apparent legislative desire for state accountability has been
frustrated by strict construction.9 Thus in New York it was not until 1929,
after a period of strict interpretation, that legislative action resulted in effective
state responsibility. Illinois is still laboring under a restrictive application of a
statute apparently designed to bring about state accountability.
With the legislative creation of the Board of Canal Appraisers in 187o, New
York began its development toward judicial determination of tort claims against
3 In

Illinois today, as a practical matter, even this type of redress is unavailable.
4 See Hall, The Law of Arrest in Relation to Contemporary Social Problems, 3 Univ. Chi.
L. Rev. 345, 346-53 (1936).
s Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 Yale L. J. 1, 129, 229 (i924-25); Borchard,
Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 36 Yale L.J. i, 757, 1039 (1926-27), 28 Col. L. Rev. 577,
734 (1928); Borchard, State and Municipal Liability in Tort, 20 A.B.A.J. 747 (i934); Borchard,
Recent Statutory Developments in Municipal Liability in Tort, 2 Legal Notes on Local
Gov't 89 (1936); Davie, Suing the State, 18 Am. L. Rev. 814 (1884); Fleischmann, The Dishonesty of Sovereignties, 33 N.Y. Bar Ass'n Rep. 229 (191o); Freund, Private Claims against
the State, 8 Pol. Sci. Q. 625 (1893); Freund, op. cit. supra note 2; Laski, The Responsibility of
the State in England, 32 Harv. L. Rev. 447 (1919); MacDonald, Substantive Liability of the
State of New York, i N.Y. Bar Ass'n Bull. 235, 238 (1929); Maguire, State Liability for Tort,
3o Harv. L. Rev. 20 (1916); Maitland, The Crown as a Corporation, 17 L.Q. Rev. 131, 142
(i9O); Tooke, The Extension of Municipal Liability in Tort, ig Va. L. Rev. 97 (1932).
6 See Borchard, The Federal Tort Claims Bill, i Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1933).
7Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 Yale L.J. 1, 12 (1924); 1 State Law Index 53,
57 (1925-26), 2 ibid. 79-80, 555 (1927-28), 3 ibid. 85, 86, 573 (1929-30), 4 ibid. 82, 550-51
(1931-32); 44 Harv. L. Rev. 432, 433-34 (1931); Borchard, Recent Statutory Developments in
Municipal Liability in Tort, 2 Legal Notes on Local Gov't 89, 92-99 (I936). It is noteworthy
that occasional reactions have occurred in the legislative extension of tort liability. Id. at 97.
8 New York Court of Claims Act, N.Y.L. 1929, c. 467, § i2a.
9 Borchard, op. cit. supra note 7, at 9-13;

Wash. 329, 133 Pac. 450 (1922); Smith v. State,
v. State, 4 Ct. CL (Ill.) 27 (1918).

42

A.L.R. 1464 (1926); Reddock v. State, 68

227

N.Y. 405, 125 N.E. 841

(1920);

Thompson
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the state.'0 This was followed by the creation of a Board of Audit whose jurisdiction was more general.II In 1883, both of these bodies were replaced by a
Board. of Claims. 12 The Court of Claims succeeded the board in1897 with no
change in jurisdiction:.3 In 19o814 the jurisdiction of the court was re-defined
and thereafter remained unchanged until 1929.' s
In 19o8, the court asserted that "the principles governing the determination
of controversies in the court of claims are the same as those between individuals
or corporations in the ordinary courts of justice ..... ",6 This view was again
asserted by the court in 1909 17 and 1917 s and was adopted by the appellate
division of the supreme court in 1914."9 With no change in the statute defining
the jurisdiction of the court, the court of appeals impinged upon this broad
concession of liability in 1917.20 A period of strict constructioni" was introduced
by a declaration that the state was immune as to governmental functions. This
qualification was adopted by the court of claims in i919.22 In 1920 the court of
appeals traveled the entire road of immunity and strict construction by declaring that the state had merely waived its immunity from suit but had not extended its liability in tort.2 3 Reversion to the way of immunity and the hopeless
consequences of legislative relief were the results of this defeat of the legislative
intent.24
10N.Y.L. 1870, c.

321.

"N.Y.L. 1883,

C. 205.

'4 N.Y.L. 19o8, c. 5i9.

3 N.Y.L. 1897, c. 36.
11N.Y.L. 1876, c. 444.
isThe court ...... has jurisdiction to hear and determine a private claim against the
state, including a claim of the executor or the administrator of a decedent who left him or her
surviving a husband, wife or next of kin, for damages for a wrongful act, neglect or default, on
the part of the state by which the decedent's death was caused .... and the state hereby
consents, in all such claims, to have its liability determined." Code of Civil Procedure § 264,
now § 12 of the Court of Claims Act, N.Y.L. 1920, C. 922.
x6 ix Ct. Cl. (N.Y.) vii (19o8); Ten Eyck v. State, ii Ct. Cl. (N.Y.) 149 (1907).
'7 Burke v. State, ig
9 N.Y.S. io89 (igog).
Smith v. State, 13 State Dep't Rep. (N.Y.) 57 (1917).
19Arnold v. State, 163 App. Div. 253, 148 N.Y.S. 479 (1914).
?oBarrett v. State, 220 N.Y. 423, ii6 N.E. 99 (1917).
" It is to be noted that except for this period of strict construction, New York has always
been liberal in the passage of special enabling acts permitting claims to be filed in the court
of claims. Likewise, since 1915 the state has been liable as an ordinary defendant for tortious
injuries in connection with its canals. N.Y.L. 1915, C. 494; amended in 1930, Cahill's Cons. L.
1930, c. 6, § 47.
- McAuliffe v. State, 107 Misc. 553, 176 N.Y.S. 679 (I919); Green v. State, 107 Misc. 557,
176 N.Y.S. 68I (1919); 5 Corn. L.Q 78, 338 (I919-20).
23 Smith v. State, 227 N.Y. 405, 125 N.E. 841 (1920).
See Borchard, Government Liability
in Tort, 34 Yale L.J. I, 9-1o (1924).
24Since the constitution of New York prohibits the legislature from auditing and determining private claims, the legislature used the device of special enabling acts in which the court
of claims was authorized to audit and allow tort claims against the state. N.Y. Const. art. 3,
§ Ig. See Williamsburgh Savings Bank v. State, 243 N.Y. 231, 153 N.E. 58 (1926); Brown v.
State, 206 App. Div. 634, 198 N.Y.S. 773 (1923); Mann v. State, 130 Misc. 559, 224 N.Y.S.
18

355

(1927).
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In 1929, with the passage of § x 2 5 of the Court of Claims Act, a new era of
state accountability in New York was initiated.26 While the court's awards
were only recommendatory,7 regular appropriations were in fact made by the
legislature to satisfy these awards. Recent statistical studies and statements by
the legal department of the state indicate that the act has operated efficiently
and economically.28 However, there have been too few decisions since 1929 to
indicate the limits of state responsibility. 29 In those cases which have arisen,3O
responsibility of the state seems to be treated like that of an ordinary private
wrongdoer.3' The confines of the traditional categories of liability, for the most
part, seem to outline the limits of state responsibility,32 and the same defenses
25 "The state hereby waives its immunity from liability for the torts of its officers and employees and consents to have its liability for such torts determined in accordance with the
same rules of law and equity as apply to an action in the supreme court against an individual
or a corporation and the state hereby assumes liability for such acts, and jurisdiction is hereby
conferred upon the court of claims to hear and determine all claims against the state to recover
damages for injuries to property or for personal injury while acting as such officer and employee ..... " N.Y.L. 1929, c. 467, § 12a.
26 It should be noted that since the New York constitution does not prohibit suit against the
state in a regular court, the decisions of the Court of Claims may be appealed to the highest
court. Freund, op. cit. supranote 2, at 14. See MacDonald, op. cit. supra note 5, at 238.
27 With respect to the "binding" effect of an award made by the court, see 17 Corn. L. Q.

254 (1932).
28

See Borchard, Recent Statutory Developments in Municipal Liability in Tort, 2 Legal

Notes on Local Gov't 89, 98-99 (1936). The statistics analyzed by Professor Borchard indicate that between September i, 1929 and January 20, 1935, aside from the claims filed under
special enabling acts and under the canal acts, there were about i5 awards made per year
with an average annual total of $82,000.
29 Professor Freund in 1932 said that although the terms of the statute seem to indicate
a legislative intent to impose liability in both governmental and corporate functions and not
to adopt the "analogy of municipal tort liability," yet it would be "extreme to say that the
state intended to make itself liable for the consequences of errors committed in the administration of justice." Freund, op. cit. supra note 2, at 15.
3* It should be noted that the court has granted awards in some cases under special enabling
acts and not under § 12a. Curley v. State, 148 Misc. 336, 265 N.Y.S. 762 (1933); Wilcove v.
State, 146 Misc. 87, 261 N.Y.S. 685 (1933); Jacobson, Inc. v. State, 140 Misc. 306, 250 N.Y.S.
562 (i93i). In these cases it appears that the claimant went to the legislature first to make
certain that an award would be granted. This was the practice from 1920 until the passage
of § 12a. The facts in these cases, however, seem to indicate that an award would have been
granted under § 12a. See Paige v. State, 269 N.Y. 352, 199 N.E. 617 (1936).

31"By section I2a, liability when proved by the rules of law applicable to individuals, has
been affirmatively assumed, and jurisdiction to determine whether such a liability has been
proved is conferred upon the court of claims .... no longer will the state use the mantle of
sovereignty to protect itself from such consequences as follow the negligent acts of individuals." Jackson v. State, 261 N.Y. 134, 136, 184 N.E. 735, 736 (1933).
-- Shaft v. State, 147 Misc. 458, 263 N.Y.S. 905 (i933) (personal injury resulting from the
improper maintenance of a state highway); Lackawanna Steel Constr. Co. v. State, 152 Misc.
604, 273 N.Y.S. 895 (1934) (conversion); Kittle v. State, 245 App. Div. 401, 284 N.Y.S. 657
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are available to the state as to any ordinary defendant in tort cases.32 Because
of a separate statute, 34 however, an important limitation is presented by the
35
highway cases.
For a claimant to recover under § ia, it is clear that the tortfeasor must be
an "officer or employee" of the state and the injury must occur while "he is
acting as such officer or employee."36 When an individual is such an "officer
or employee" is sometimes difficult to ascertain. In a recent case, 37 the court
of appeals held that the employees of a privately owned reformatory subject
to state visitation were "employees" of the state within § i2a. This holding
seems to imply that the employees of quasi-corporations and corporations both
public and private entrusted by the state with the performance of governmental functions are "officers and employees" within § I2a.38 Since such subordinate agencies, in the performance of governmental functions, are immune
from liability,39 such a construction leads to the result that liability attaches

to the state but not to such agencies.
A survey of state accountability in Illinois presents a strange contrast. The
present Court of Claims was created by the legislature in 1917.40 Its predeces-

sors were the Commission of Claims created in i87 741 and the Court of Claims
(1935) (personal injury to state park visitor); Frate v. State, 245 App. Div. 442, 283 N.Y.S.
686 (1935) (personal injury to business visitor); Tooley v. State, 141 Misc. 4, 252 N.Y.S. 278
(i931) (injury by state employee driving state truck).
33 Miller v. State, 148 Misc. 184, 265 N.Y.S. 455 (1933) (contributory negligence); Countryman v. State, 159 Misc. 846, 288 N.Y.S. 612 (i936) (proximate cause); Consiglio v. State, 286
N.Y.S. 32 (i936) (sixty day limitation for filing claims). After the enactment of § i2a, the
special enabling act was used to waive this last defense. Wilcove v. State, 146 Misc. 87, 261
N.Y.S. 685 (1933). This device has also been used to grant a convict the right to present his
claim. Green v. State, 290 N.Y.S. 36 (1936).
34 Highway Law § 58; N.Y. Cons. L. 1930, c. 25, § 58. This provides for state immunity
from May i until November iS where the injury results from a defect in a state or county
highway.

asSeveral decisions have held that § 12a does not supersede this highway law. Miller v.
State, 137 Misc. 768, 244 N.Y.S. 547 (i93o), aft'd, 231 App. Div. 363, 247 N.Y.S. 399 (1931)
(seinble); Hinds v. State, 144 Misc. 464, 258 N.Y.S. 748 (1932). This construction has led the
courts to draw a rather tenuous distinction between injuries caused by a "defect in the highway" and a "condition existing by reason of misfeasance or negligence." See Hinds v. State,
144 Misc. 464, 258 N.Y.S. 748 (1932).
36Sears v. State, 152 Misc. 32, 272 N.Y.S. 694 (1934).
37 Paige v. State, 269 N.Y. 352, 199 N.E. 617 (1936). This decision seems to indicate a
tendency to construe § x2a liberally.

38See the strong dissent of Lehman, J., 269 N.Y. 352, 357-58, ig N.E. 617,
39 Borchard, op. cit. supranote 23, at 22-28, 41-45.
40 Ill. State Bar Stats. i935, c. 37, §§ 462-75.

619-20.

4 Ill. L. 1877, p. 71. For the early history of claims against the state in Illinois see Constitutional Convention Bull. no. 1o, 864-68 (1920).
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established in 1903.42 While these precedessors were empowered to "hear and
determine" claims43 against the state "according to the principles of equity and
justice," the present court was authorized "to hear and determine all claims and
demands, legal and equitable, liquidated and unliquidated, ex contractu and ex
delicto, which the State, as a sovereign commonwealth, should, in equity and
good conscience, discharge and pay."44
Each of these enactments raised the problem of whether it provided for
judicial determination of tort claims against the state. The New York courts
prior to 1917 and after 1929 liberally construed similar statutes to provide for
such judicial determination. Likewise, the Court of Claims of Illinois might
well have construed these enactments to mean that the court was to determine
in what situations it would be just and proper for the state to compensate victims of torts. This interpretation would have afforded not only a sufficient
ground for tort responsibility on a broad basis, but would have made possible
the development of a system of state responsibility based on well-defined though
flexible rules. The court, instead, chose to prefer a strict construction similar to
that of the New York Court of Appeals in 1920.4s Each of these enactments was
followed by a pronouncement that the statute was procedural and that awards
could be made only where there existed a claim against the state under recognized rules of law and equity.46 Since no state tort responsibility exists under
such rules, this construction would seem to imply that no awards whatever
could be made to a victim of a tort. This apparently was not the legislative intent, nor has the court consistenty applied this construction. It has granted
awards to tort claimants in quite a number of cases. At most, this interpretation must be taken to be a statement of a policy to confine state liability within
narrow limits. A survey of the decisions of the court, however, discloses that it
has not consistently followed such a policy.
The opinions of the predecessors of the present court manifest a strict adherence to the view that the legislature did not provide for state tort responsibility.47 The decisions of the present court since its creation in 1917 consider
the merits of a claimant's demand on two grounds: (i) the "legal and equitable"
liability of the state; (2) the liability of the state under the doctrine of "social
42Il.

L. 1903, P. 140.

4The commission of I877 was to "....
hear and determine all unadjusted claims of all
persons, against the state......" In i889 the jurisdiction of the commission was defined in
greater detail. See Ill. L. i889, p. 69.
44Ill.State Bar Stats. 935, c. 37, § 476(4).
4S

Smith v. State, 227 N.Y. 405,

125

N.E. 84x (192o); 5 Corn. L.Q. 338

46Schmidt v. State, i Ct. Cl. (I3.) 76, 8o (i8go); Henke v. State,
(ioo6); Thompson v. State, 4 Ct.Cl. (Ill.) 26 (i9i8).

2

(1920).

Ct. Cl. (Ill.) ii, 14

47But see Crawford v. State, i Ct.CI. (Mll.) 9i (i8go), and comment by Maguire, op. cit.

supra note 5, at 28.
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justice and equity."48 The court has almost uniformly denied liability on the
"legal and equitable" basis.49 This denial has taken the form of statements that
the doctrine of respondeatsuperior is inapplicable to the state,50 that the state is
not liable for the torts of its agents, servants, and officers s' and that the state is
immune from tort liability in the exercise of governmental functions.S2 These
latter pronouncements of the court make it doubtful whether the denial of
"legal and equitable" liability is on the theory that the state is immune only
in the exercise of governmental functions or on the common law theory that the
state is immune in all situations. In one group of cases, the court announced
that the maintenance of the Illinois-Michigan canal was a non-governmental
function and that therefore the state was not immune.53 Yet in a series of later
cases, the court overruled its previous holding and argued that the state is not
a corporation; therefore any activity exercised under its direct and sole control
must be governmental.54 In 1921 the court overruled its overruling by stating
that the rule of respondeat superiorapplied to the conduct of the canal.s However, in no case of any kind since 192,s6 has the court found the state performing
a non-governmental function. This differentiation on the basis of governmental
and non-governmental functions represents an inroad upon the common law
48This doctrine was "characterized, first as social justice, then as social justice and equity,

and afterwards as equity and good conscience." Crabtree v. State, 7 Ct.Cl (InI.) 207, 218
(1933). It was also applied in cases where the claimant was an employee of the state. See
Smith v. State, 4 Ct. Cl. (III.) 74 (1919).
49

In some of its opinions, the court divulges some of the reasons for the denial of liability.

The burden on taxpayers is mentioned as a motivating influence in restricting the number of
awards made. O'Brien v. State, 5 Ct. Cl. (Ill.) 20, 21 (1924); Carter v. State, 5 Ct.Cl. (Ill.)
102, 103 (1925); Crabtree v. State, 7 Ct.Cl. (MIl.) 207, 220 (1933). The court also cites United
States v. Kirkpatrick (9Wheat. (U.S.) 720, 723 (1824) ), for the proposition that the state does
not guarantee the fidelity of the agents and servants it employs

" ....

since that would in-

volve it, in all its operations, in endless embarrassments, and difficulties and losses which
would be subversive to the public interests ..... " Alford v. State, 8 Ct.Cl. (Ill.) 16, 17 (i933).
soSchwab v. State, 4 Ct.Cl. (I1.) 77, 78 (i919); Carlson v. State, 8 Ct.Cl. (Ill.) 131,

(1934).

sxBraun v. State, 6

Ct.Cl. (I1.) 104

132

(1928); Fenoglio v. State, 7 Ct.CI. (Ill.) 4, 5 (i93i).

sTuttle v. State, s Ct. CL (Ill.) 3 (1924); McDonald v. State, 8 Ct. Cl. (Ill.) 84 (2934).
s3Holmes v. State, i Ct. Cl. (Ill.) 324, 331

(19o5); Phillips v. State, i Ct. CI. (Il.) 332, 333

(i9o).

Morrissey v. State, 2 Ct. Cl. (Ill.) 254, 265-71 (1914); Ackerman v. State, 2 Ct. CI. (Ill.)
('914); Anderson v. State, 2 Ct. Cl. (Ill.) 273 (1914). See comment in Maguire, op. cit.

54
272

supra note 5, at 31-32.
ss County of La Salle v. State, 4 Ct. Cl. (IM.) 133 (1921).

s6In 1925, the court denied an award on "legal" grounds, but granted an award on "social
justice and equity." Allen v. State, 5 Ct. CL. (Ill.) 189 (1925); County of La Salle v. State,
5 Ct. CL.(Ill.) 190 (1925); Illinois Traction, Inc. v. State, 5 Ct. Cl. 422 (1927). In 1935, the
court denied both "legal" liability and also liability on "social justice and equity." Hanna v.
State, 8 Ct. Cl. (Ill.) 349 (i935).
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rule by a resort to the theory of responsibility of municipal corporations; a stage
in the development of the civil law in its progress to state liability s7
The first decade in the history of the present court reveals a rather liberal
tendency to make awards on the ground of "social justice and equity." The
period from 1927 until 1933 was one of transition. The tendency was from
liberality to stringency in granting awards on this ground. Since 1933, the
court has denied recovery on both the "legal" and "social justice" grounds and
has proclaimed that the establishment of the court was to provide "a remedy"
but not to create state tort liability. The liberality of the present court in the
first period of its existence expressed itself in the granting of awards not only
where at common law an ordinary defendant would be liable, but even in cases
where an ordinary defendant would not be liable.sS The apparent presence of
contributory negligence did not deter the court from granting an award on the
basis of "social justice and equity."59 The period of transition was one in which
the court became more and more stringent. 6o In 1932 the court announced in
Kayls v. State that the requirements for recovery on the ground of "social
justice and equity" were a serious injury, "gross and wanton negligence," and
the absence of contributory negligence.6! However, six months later the court
granted an award where the injury was not seriousA2 Subsequent decisions reveal situations where, although the enumerated elements seemed to be present,
recovery was denied. 63 Likewise, decisions prior to the Kayks case reveal clearly
that awards were denied although the indicated requirements were present; 64
while awards were granted where some of these elements were absent. 65 In
Crabtreev. State,6 the court noted that sympathy motivated it to stray from
the strict and true view that the act of 1917 did not create state tort responsis7Takayanagi, Liability Without Fault in the Modem Civil and Common Law, i6 Ill. L.
Rev. 268, 292-94 (1921).

59 Award granted for tort by employee of state charitable institution. Schwab v. State,
4 Ct. Cl. (Ill.) 77 (1919); award granted to claimant although statute of limitations under the
law creating the court had run. Kubler v. State, 4 Ct. Cl. (III.) 203 (1921).

s9Motter v. State, 4 Ct. Cl. (II1.) i59 (1921); Stachowiak v. State, 5 Ct. Cl. (11.) 275
(1927). It is to be noted that the court, where it can, relies on various common law defenses
in addition to the non-liability of the state. Smith v. State, 6 Ct. CL. (II1.) 133 (1929) (contributory negligence); Pelka, Admr'x. v. State, 6 Ct. Cl. (Ill.) 390 (i93o) (charitable institution); Bailey v. State, 7 Ct. CL. (I1.) 171 (1933) (proximate cause); Dunning v. State, s Ct. CI.
232, 233 (1926) (independent contractor).
6
0Mercer v. State, 6 Ct. Cl. (Ill.) 20 (1927); Stoddard v. State, 6 Ct. CI. (III.) 27 (1927);
Perry v. State, 6 Ct. Cl. (Ill.) 8i (1928).
6zKayhs v. State, 7 Ct. Cl. (Ill.) 93 (1932).

Sprague Dairy Co. v. State, 7 Ct. CL. (Ill.) 227 (1933).
v. State, 8 Ct. Cl. (I.) 196 (1934).
64 Edgar v. State, 4 Ct. Cl. (11.) 17 (i9x8).
65McGee v. State, 4 Ct. Cl. (Ili.) 336 (1923) (neither gross negligence nor serious injury
were present); Bean v. State, 5 Ct. CI. (MI.) 375 (1927) (serious injury absent).
62

63 Palumbo

67 Ct. Cl. (Ill.) 207 (1933).
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bility. The court made a firm resolution to check itself when the appeal to its
sympathies became strong. Thenceforth, a claimant would be required to show
that he was entitled to redress under recognized rules of law and equity.67 Yet
this resolution was short-lived; for a month later68 the court reverted to the
Kayks, or restricted "social justice," rule and then granted an award even where
the injury was not serious. 69 In 1934 the court again observed that the Crabtree
case represented the proper rule.70 The awards made under the rule in the
Kays case were improper.7' The decisions since 1933 clearly indicate that the
court will not grant redress for the tortious wrongs of the officers and employees
of the state. Under the present practice of the court 72 and the statement of
policy by the present governor, 73 the victim of a tort is limited to a personal
suit against the tortfeasor.
Since the constitution of Illinois prohibits the suit of the state in any of its
courts, 74 it was not possible, as in New York, to organize the court of claims as

a regular part of the judicial system of the state. Not only are its awards
recommendatory,75 but its decisions may not be appealed to the regular courts.
Hence the court is in fact, though perhaps not in theory, a court of first and
last resort, similar to the administrative courts of European countries. An examination of the court's decisions from the point of view of similar factual
situations discloses flagrant inconsistencies7 6 Some of these can be explained
67

69 Connole v. State, 7 Ct. Cl. (Ill.) 232 (1933).
Dairy Co. v. State, 7 Ct. Cl. (Ill.) 227 (1933).

Id. at 222.

69Sprague
70 Alford

v. State, 8 Ct. Cl. (Ill.) 16 (1933); Kramer v. State, 8 Ct. Cl. (Ill.) 3, (i934).

Reid v. State, 8 Ct. Cl. (Ill.) 163, 164 (I935).
7' No awards have been granted in tort cases since 1933. The decisions made in 1936 are
not yet reported.
7 "Even if there is a liability on the part of the State for damages received in the manner
indicated by the appropriation bill, there has been no evidence presented or adjudication as
to the extent of the damages or that the damages were caused in the manner charged. The
determination of such issues is the proper function of the Court of Claims and the payment of
such claims should not be made until these issues have been determined and awards entered
by that court." Veto Messages of the Governor of Ill. on Bills Passed 58th, 59th General As7'

semblies, pp. 9o-9i (i933-35).

74Ill. Const., art. 4, § 26. It is noteworthy that the constitution of 1842 provided that the
general assembly should direct in what manner the state was to be sued. Ill. Const. x848, art.
3, §34. No action was taken by the assembly from 1848 until 1870, when the present constitution was adopted. The proposed constitution of 1862 provided that the state could be sued in
the regular courts of the state. The convention debates of 1869-70 indicate that the reason for
the present provision was the existence of certain canal and internal improvement bonds.
Constl. Cony. Bull. 865 (192o). The constitutional convention of 192o eliminated this prohibition of suit against the state; but the proposed constitution was not adopted.
75 Sherman v. State, 6 Ct. Cl. (ll.) 346 (1929).
76The court has reached divergent views in the following situations: (i) Where inmates of
prisons sustain injuries because of the negligence of guards. Tiller v. State, 4 Ct. CL. (Ill.) 243
(1922); cf. Thompson v. State, 5 Ct. Cl. (Ill.) 65 (1925). (2) Where inmates of institutions
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by the fact that the cases came before the court in different periods in the decline
of the doctrine of "social justice and equity."" Yet some of the cases which are
in apparent conflict arose within the same period of decline.78 Nor is it easy to
discover factual differentiations upon which some of the contrary results can
be based.79
It is possible that the court feels that consistency is unimportant in view of
its subjection to unlimited legislative and executive check. The act creating the
present court provides that the jurisdiction of the court shall be exclusive and
that no appropriation shall be made by the legislature for the payment of any
claim over which the court has jurisdiction unless the court has granted an
award on such claim.80 But this provision is merely a declaration of policy,
since the court is a statutory body and cannot deprive the legislature of the
power to make such appropriations."' The legislature has made appropriations
in situations over which the court had jurisdiction not only where the court
has not considered the case,82 but also where the court has actually denied an
for the insane are injured through negligence. Edgar v. State, 4 Ct. Cl. (Inl.) 17 (i9,8); cf.
Wilson v. State, 5 Ct. Cl. (Ill.) 137 (1925). (3) Where a state employee negligently operates
a state owned automobile. Braun v. State, 6 Ct. Cl. (Ill.) 104 (1928); cf. Brawner v. State,
5 Ct. Cl. (Ill.) 194 (1925).

(4) Where physicians

of a state institution negligently perform an

operation. Tosi v. State, 4 Ct. CL. (IIl.) 190 (1921); cf. Palumbo v. State, 8 Ct. Cl. (Ill.) 196
(1934). (s) Property damage caused by highway maintenance operations. Jones v. State, 6
Ct. Cl. (11.) 273 (1929); cf. Loges v. State, 8 Ct. Cl. (Ill.) 53 (1934). (6) See also the canal
cases, discussed p. 448 supra and notes 53, 55.
77 Tosi v. State, 4 Ct. Cl. (II.) 190 (1921), and Palumbo v. State, 8 Ct. Cl. (Ill.) i96 (1934);
Braun v. State, 6 Ct. CL. (Ill.) 104 (1928), and Brawner v. State, 5 Ct. CL. (lI.) 194 (1925).
78Tiller v. State, 4 Ct. CL. (Ill.) 243 (1922), and Thompson v. State, 5 Ct. Cl. (Ill.) 65
(1925); Edgar v. State, 4 Ct. Cl. (fI.) 17 (i918), and Schwab v. State, 4 Ct. Cl. (Ill.) 77 (919).
79 Some of the factors which seem to motivate the court in granting relief are interesting to
note: The need of the claimant has been emphasized. Kubler v. State, 4 Ct. Cl. (Ill.) 203
(1921). The recommendation of a department head carries weight. Bean v. State, 5 Ct. CL.
(UII.) 375 (1927); Tunnicliff v. State, 7 Ct. Cl. (Iln.) 15 (1931). Yet in one case an award was
granted contrary to the recommendation of a department head. Channing v. State, s Ct. Cl.
(Ill.) 430 (1927). A letter from the secretary of state was effectual in Crabb v. State, 5 Ct. Cl.
(Ill.) 432 (1927). In other cases, the consent of the attorney general seemed to be a decisive
factor. Hutson v. State, 6 Ct. Cl. (ll.) 273 (1929). There is some suggestion in the cases that
the court may at times be influenced by the financial condition of the state and by the fiscal
and other policies of the administration.
so Court of Claims Act § 13.
st Fergus v. Russell, 277 Ill. 20, X15 N.E. x66 (1917) (dealing with similar provision in the
1913 act for exclusive jurisdiction of the court); Crabtree v. State, 7 Ct. Cl. (InI.) 207, 221

(1933).
82 House Bill no. 76, III. L. 1919, p. iig; Senate Bill no. 117, Ill. L. I919, p. 122; House Bill
no. 181, II1. L. 1919, p. 128; House Bill no. 278, Ill. L. 1925, p. 135. In the following cases,
the legislature granted appropriations for claims merely pending before the court on which
the court had not handed down a decision. Shumway v. State, 8 Ct. Cl. (Ill.) 4 3 (i934) (claim
was later denied by the court), House Bill no. 1072 (i933); Baird v. State (not yet reported),
Senate Bill no. 609, Ill. L. 1935, p. 63.
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award. 83 The governor in some instances has by veto frustrated some of these
legislative attempts to grant appropriations when the claim had not been
5
passed upon by the court 84 and where the court had denied an award8 It is
also noteworthy that the governor has in certain cases overruled the court of
claims by vetoing appropriations made by the legislature to cover awards made
86
by this court.
In the light of the present practice of the court and the policy of the present
governor the sharp contrast of Illinois practice with that of New York, where
a system of broad state responsibility is being established, is obvious. The
Illinois legislature in 1935 attempted to improve this situation by a bill apparently intended to create state tort responsibility like that of private individuals. 87 The bill passed both houses, but the governor vetoed the bill because
L. 1919,P. 124; Thompson
83Green v. State, 4 Ct. Cl. (Il1.) 9 (igi8), House Bill no. 387, Ill.
L. ig1g, p. 126; Cain v. State, 3 Ct.
v. State, 4 Ct. Cl. (I1.) 26 (igi8), House Bill no. 388, Ill.
Cl. (Ill.) gi (igi6), House Bill no. 735, Ill. L. 1923, p. 45; Gains v. State, 6 Ct. Cl. (Ill.) 5
(1927), House Bill no. i224, Ill. L. 193i, p. 163, at X75; Bangs v. State, 8 Ct. Cl. (Ill.) 5o8
(1935), Senate Bill no. 6og, Ill. L. 1935, p. 6384 Appropriation to Fay V. Shuraway, House Bill no. 1072 (i933); Veto Messages, loc. cit.
supra note 73, at 57; Appropriation to Margaret S. Baird, Senate Bill no. 6og, Ill. L. 1935,
o.
p. 63, Veto Messages, loc. cit. supra note 73, at 9
L. 1935, p. 63, Veto
5sBangs v. State, 8 Ct. Cl. (Ill.) 508 (i935), Senate Bill no. 609, Ill.
Messages, loc. cit. supranote 73, at 9o; Gans v. State, 6 Ct. Cl. (iII.) 5 (1927), House Bill no.
L. 1931, p. 163, at 175; O'Neil Construction Co. v. State, 6 Ct. CL.(Ill.) 450 (1930),
1224, Ill.
House Bill no. 1224, Ill. L. 1931, p. 163, at 175.
L. 1933, p. 147, at 149;
8 Meyer v. State, 7 Ct. Cl. (Ill.) 131 (1933), Senate Bill no. 573, Ill.
cit. supra note 73, at 30, 9o; Wood v. State, 7 Ct. Cl. (Ill.) 7i6 (933);
Veto Messages, loc.
Senate Bill no. 573, Ill. L. 1933, p. 147, at 15I, Veto Messages, loc. cit. supra note 73, at 30.
In his veto message, of appropriations for these claims, the governor said: "This jurisdiction
was vested in the Court of ClaimsbyAct of the General Assembly because such claims generally
present controverted questions of law and fact, which can be more satisfactorily determined
by a judicial tribunal than by a legislative body. However, an award made by the Court of
Claims does not, in legal effect, amount to a judgment against the State of Illinois. While
action of the Court of Claims is essential for a proper consideration of the merits of each claim,
and provided for by statute, such action is merely advisory to the General Assembly. The
legislature must finally approve and provide for the payment of each claim, subject to my
constitutional power of veto.
"Following an investigation of the facts and a careful inspection of the opinions filed by
the Court in the afore-mentioned claims, it is my conclusion there is, in each case, serious question as to the legal liability of the State to compensate for the damages alleged to have been
sustained." P. 31.
87 The bill provided that the court of claims should have the power: "To hear and determine
all claims and demands, legal and equitable, liquidated and unliquidated, ex-contractu and exdelicto, which the State, as a sovereign commonwealth, should discharge and pay. To hear and
determine all claims and demands, legal and equitable, liquidated and unliquidated, ex-contractu and ex-delicto, in respect of which the claimant would be entitled to redress against the
State, if the State were suable. Where any person has suffered damage as a result of the performance by the State of any of its governmental functions, the doctrine of respondea smperior
shall not apply; provided, however, that the Court shall have the power to allow claims in
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'88
its provisions were "directly contradictory and impossible of interpretation.
9
While the governor's criticism of the bill was just,1 its passage indicates a legislative intent to remedy a state of affairs in need of reform.
It requires little examination, however, to show that any reform which is
directed merely toward a revision of the policies of the court of claims can accomplish only a superficial and partial solution of the existing problems. Present confusion with respect to the liability of municipalities and other subdivisions of the state cannot be ignored. Here again, as in the case of the state
proper, Illinois has adhered to the traditional rules of municipal tort accountability.90 The municipality is immune from liability for the torts of its agents or
officers in the performance of governmental functions.9' In the conduct of its
"corporate," or non-governmental functions, the tort liability of an ordinary
defendant attaches.9' Both commentators, 93 and courts 94 have emphasized the
difficulty, uncertainty, and inconsistency of the applications of this rule. Courts
have disagreed not only on the classification of particular functions, but also on
the justifications and criteria for such classifications.95 Courts96 and writers97
have urged the abolition of this attempt at differentiation between non-govern-

cases now pending, or hereafter brought in said court to recover damages from the State for
the death or injury of any person, or for the injury to or destruction of property, caused by the
wilful and wanton act or conduct, or the negligence of an employee of the State while acting
in the course of his employment, where there is no contributory negligence upon the part of
such injured claimant." House Bill no. 576 (I935).
88Veto Messages, loc. cit. supranote 73, at io4. Another ground for the veto was that one
part of the bill, which related to damages in case of injury or death to members of the National
Guard, was unconstitutional.
89Even a cursory reading of the bill reveals its contradictory provisions.
90 Gebhardt v. Village of La Grange Park, 354 Ill. 234, 236, i88 N.E. 372, 373 (1933).
McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 2771 (2d ed. 1928).
91Tollefson v. City of Ottawa, 228 Ill. 134, 8i N.E. 823 (1907). McQuillin, op. cit. supra
note go, at § 2792. See Hall, op. cit. supra note 4.
92 Roumbos v. City of Chicago, 332111. 7o, 8o, 163 N.E. 361, 364 (1928). McQuillin, op. cit.
supra note go, at § 2793.
93 Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 Yale L. J. 129, 229 (1924-25); Harno, Tort
Immunity of Municipal Corporations, 4 111. L. Q. 28 (1921); Doddridge, Distinction between
Governmental and Proprietary Functions of Municipal Corporations, 23 Mich. L. R. 325
(1925); David, Municipal Liability in Tort in California, 6 So. Calif. L. Rev. 249 (1933); 7 ibid.
48, 214, 295, 372 (r933-34).
94Roumbos v. City of Chicago, 332 Ill. 70, 74, 163 N.E. 361, 363 (1928); Johnston v. City
of Chicago, 258 1ll. 494, 497, ioi N.E. 96o, 96i (1913); Irvine v. Town of Greenwood, 89 S. C.

511, 72 S.E. 228 (IgII).
95 Borchard, State and Municipal Liability in Tort, 2o A. B. A. J. 747, 748 (2934).
96 Bedtke v. City of Chicago, 240 IIl. App. 493, 501 (1926).
97 Doddridge, op. cit. supra note 93; Harno, op. cit. supra note 93; 34 Harv. L. Rev. 66
(1920).
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mental and governmental functions, and have suggested that reform take the
direction of liability for all activities.98
The courts in Illinois have decided that the maintenance of sewers,9 9 streets,'10
sidewalks,"°" bridges,"' 2 a public library, °3 a water system for domestic and
°6
04
garbage removal, °5 the construction of part of a city hall,
commercial use,X
and the operation of a fire tug' 0 9 are
corporate functions. Yet the activities of firemen on land,x10 the construction
street cleaning, x°7 lighting of streets,

°8

12
and operation of schools,"' the use of a water system by a fire department,
the maintenance of a hospital"3 and swimming pool,"'4 and the exercise of
police powers which include activities pertaining to the "safety, health, welfare,
and good order of the public,"' zs are governmental functions. Thus where firemen were negligent on land the city was immune;" 6 but where firemen were
negligent on water the city was liable."x 7 Educational activities in the form of the
construction and maintenance of schools were governmental;" 8 but in the form
of the maintenance of a public library they were non-governmental."9 The

98Borchard, op. cit. supra note 95. For recent developments in county and municipal
liablity in other states, see Borchard, Recent Statutory Development in Municipal Liability
in Tort, 2 Legal Notes on Local Gov't 89, 92-98 (1936).
371, 46 N.E. 244 (1897); Republic Co. v. City of
99City of Chicago v. Seben, 165 Ill.

Rockford, 251 Ill.
App. 1o9 (1928).
loo Simon v. City of Chicago, 279 IlM. App. 80 (1935).
400, 124 N.E. 547 (1919); White v. City of Belle"ol
Hanrahan v. City of Chicago, 289 Ill.
ville, 284 111. App. 322, 329, 1 N.E. (2d) 790, 793 (1936) (dicum).
9, 86 N.E. 152 (1908).
- Gathman v. City of Chicago, 236 Ill.
Johnston v. City of Chicago, 258 Ill.
494, ioi N.E. 96o (1913).
104City of Chicago v. Selz, Schwab and Co., 202 Il.545, 67 N.E. 386 (1903).
App. 531 (1935).
"osWasilevitsky v. City of Chicago, 280 Ill.
431 (1871).
"'a City of Chicago v. Dermody, 6i Ill.
107 Roumbos v. City of Chicago, 332 IU. 70, 163 N.E. 361 (1928).
log Stedwell v. City of Chicago, 297 Ill. 486, 13o N.E. 729 (1921).
lo9Thompson Nay. Co. v. City of Chicago, 79 Fed. 984 (D.C. InI. I897).
103

334 (1883).
110Wilcox v. City of Chicago, 107 Ill.
332, 337, 49 N.E. 536, 538 (i898) (dictum).
- Kinnare v. City of Chicago, 171 Ill.
545, 55o, 67 N.E. 386, 388 (19o3)
- City of Chicago v. Selz, Schwab and Co., 202 Ill.
(diatum).
"13Tollefson v. City of Ottawa, 228 Ill.134, 8i N.E. 823 (1907).
114Gebhardt v. Village of La Grange Park, 354 Il. 234, 188 N.E. 372 (I933).
S Roumbos v. City of Chicago, 332 IR. 70, 82, 163 N.E. 361, 366 (1928); Culver v. City
154, 54 N.E.
of Streator, 130I1.
238, 22 N.E. 81o (I889); Craig v. City of Charleston, i8o Ill.
184 (1899); Evans v. City of Kankakee, 231111. 223,83 N.E. 223 (1907).
334 (1883).
Wilcox v. City of Chicago, 107 Ill.
nI6

1897).
17Thompson Nav. Co. v. City of Chicago, 79 Fed. 984 (D.C. Ill.
Kinnare v. City of Chicago, 171 Ill. 332, 337, 49 N.E. 536, 538 (1898) (dicaum).
494, ioi N.E. 960 (i913).
u9 Johnston v. City of Chicago, 258 Ill.
118
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negligent use of a fire hydrant by an employee of the water department rendered
the city liable; but such negligence by a fireman with respect to the same hy2
drant would have left the city immune."
To justify such classifications, the courts of Illinois and other courts have
searched for various criteria., Activities voluntarily assumed by the municipality are non-governmental, but those thrust upon it by the legislature are
governmental." Functions which are performed primarily for local benefit are
non-governmental, but those performed for the people of the state as a whole
are governmental ."

However, if a voluntarily assumed activity results in pub-

lic benefit, it is governmental.124 Agents and servants engaged in governmental
activities, though hired, paid, and controlled by the municipality are agents of
the state; hence the doctrine of respondeatsuperior has no application to these
functions. s5 Commentators have emphasized the inconsistencies and fallacies
6
involved in these and other attempted, distinctions.1
The existing state of the law has led even the courts to conclude that:
no definition of the terms "corporate" and "governmental" has been declared which
is of much practical value ..... 127
The ordinary principles of the law pertaining to torts ought to apply to municipal
corporations .... and the distinction between governmental and ministerial functions .... should be abandoned." 8

The basis of the distinction is difficult to state, and there is no established rule for
the determination of what belongs to one class or the other class. It originated with
the courts. Generally it is applied to escape difficulties, in order that injustice may not
result from the recognition of technical defenses based upon the governmental character of such corporations.9
Not only have the courts in Illinois adhered to a rule of municipal tort
liability based on a differentiation of corporate and governmental activities,
but they have established the rule that "public involuntary quasi corporations"
2oCity of

Chicago v. Selz, Schwab and Co.,

202 Ill.
545,

55o, 67 N.E. 386, 388 (1903).

' Borchard, op. cit. supra note 95.
Roumbos v. City of Chicago, 332 Ill.
70, 76-77, 163 N.E. 361, 364 (1928); Johnston v.
City of Chicago, 258 Ill.
494,499, oi N.E. 960, 962 (19r3); Gebhardt v. Village of La Grange
Park, 354 Ill.
234, 238, 188 N.E. 372, 374 (I933).
,2Roumbos v. City of Chicago, 332 IU. 70, 77-78, 163 N.E. 361, 364 (1928); Gebhardt v.
Village of La Grange Park, 354 Ill.
234, 238, i88 N.E. 372, 374 (1933); Wasilevitsky v. City of
Chicago, 280 Ill.
App. 531, 541 (1935).
124Gebhardt
12s

v. Village of La Grange Park, 354 Ill.
234, 238, i88 N.E. 372, 374 (1933).
Culver v. City of Streator, 130 IM.238, 243, 22 N.E. 8zo, 81 (1889).

6
Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 Yale L. J. 129,
Rev. 66 (1920).
x

13o-38 (1924);

-7 Roumbos v. City of Chicago, 332 Ill.
70, 74, 163 N.E. 361, 363 (1928).
Bedtke v. City of Chicago, 240 Ill.
App. 493, 501-2 (1926).
"9 Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 192 (1922).
128

34 Harv. L.
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are immune from tort responsibility. 130 Thus townships, x3x counties,132 and

school districts33 are not accountable for torts of their agents.134 These bodies
have been declared to be mere agencies and subdivisions of the state. 35 This
distinction in the tort responsibility of municipalities and quasi-corporations
has been supported by other justifications. While the municipality is created
and assumes its duties "voluntarily," these quasi-corporations are created
x
While
nolens volens and have their duties thrust upon them involuntarily.'3
the municipal corporation is created for the benefit of local inhabitants, the
activities of the quasi-corporation are concerned with the welfare of the state
as a whole.37 Likewise, the powers and purposes of such quasi-corporations
are more limited and restricted than those of a municipality. 138 Commentators
have properly attacked both the differentiation in the tort liability of municipalities and these quasi-corporations and the alleged justifications.39
To a certain extent the legislature has come to the aid of the courts. Thus in
1877140 and 19o514Y the legislature enacted statutes providing for the liability
of cities and counties for injuries to person and property as a result of mob
violence. In 193i the statute of 19o5 was amended to impose such liability also
upon park districts and to increase the maximum compensation for such in130 Sevick v. County of Cook,

282

Ill. App. 451, 455 (1935); Town of Waltham v. Kemper,

55 Ill. 346 (1870). See Roumbos v. City of Chicago, 332 Ill. 70, 75, 163 N.E. 361, 364 (1928).
McQuillin, op. cit. supranote go, at § 2775.

Cooney v. Town of Hartland, 95 Ill. 516 (iS8o).
x32White v. County of Bond, 58 Ill. 297 (1871); Hollenbeck v. County of Winnebago, 95
Ill. 148 (i88o); Sevick v. County of Cook, 282 11. App. 451, 454 (2935).
133 City of Chicago v. City of Chicago, etc., 243 Ill. App. 327, 329 (1927) (board of education); see Roumbos v. City of Chicago, 332 IlM. 70, 75, 163 N.E. 361, 364 (1928).
134 Yet park districts have been declared first to be a "quasi-municipal corporation." Wilcox v. People, go Ill. 186, 193 (2878) and later a municipal corporation. Stein v. West Chicago
Park Com'rs, 247 Ill. App. 479, 483 (1926). So drainage districts were first declared to be
municipal corporations. See Com'rs v. Kelsey, 120 Ill. 482, 484, 1i N.E. 256, 256 (2887).
Later such bodies were declared to be "quasi corporations." Elmore v. Drainage Com'rs,
135 Ill. 269, 277, 25 N.E. 1010, 1012 (i8go). This classification was questioned later in Bradbury v. Vandalia Drainage Dist., 236 Ill. 36, 46, 86 N.E. 163, 166 (igo8).
'3s Sevick v. County of Cook, 282 Ill. App. 451, 455 (i935); Lindstrom v. City of Chicago,
'3'

331 Ill. 144, 147, 162 N.E. 128, 130 (1928).

Y36
Elmore v. Drainage Com'rs, 135111. 269, 276, 25 N.E. ioo, IOIi (i8go); City of Chicago
v. City of Chicago, etc., 243 IlL App. 327, 329 (1927); McQuillin, op. cit. supra note go, at
§ 2775.
'37 Johnston v. City of Chicago, 258 Ill. 494, 499, i N.E. 960, 962 (1913); Roumbos v.
City of Chicago, 332 II. 70, 77, 263 N.E. 361, 364 (1928); Kinnare v. City of Chicago, 171 Il.

332, 337, 49 N.E. 536, 537 (i898).
s County of Cook v. City of Chicago, 3i1Ill. 234, 241, 142 N.E. 512, 514 (1924);
Drainage Com'rs, 135 Il. 269, 274, 25 N.E. 2oo, ioii (i8go).
139 Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 Yale l, 22-28, 41-45 (1924).
'4MII.

L. 1887, p. 237.

14'11. L. 1905, p. i9o.

Elmore v.

NOTES
juries.142 Likewise, in an effort to abolish the distinction between the terrestrial

and aquatic activities of the fire department, the legislature has provided for
municipal liability for the negligence of firemen in the operation of motor
vehicles.143 Such minor extensions of liability merely serve to emphasize the
need for a thorough reform.
The preceding survey of community responsibility in Illinois has revealed
that the attempted extensions of state accountability through revision of the
court of claims statutes have been ineffective, and that attempted extensions of
the liability of municipalities and quasi-corporations have been trifling. The
result has been that the unfortunate victim of a tort committed by an employee or officer of the state is left only with a dubious remedy against the
wrongdoer. Since the court of claims under its present policy will not grant
awards in tort cases and the governor has indicated that he will adhere to the
policy of exclusive jurisdiction of the court of claims, the victim cannot appeal
to the legislature. The public quasi-corporation is likewise immune from liability. Here, too, the only redress is a personal suit. Finally, the tort responsibility
of municipalities depends upon inconsistent and artificial distinctions between
governmental and non-governmental functions.
While the federal governmentX44 and New York'45 have made considerable
advances in community responsibility, much remains to be done. It is obvious
that while any proposed reform must indicate with some definiteness the limits
of community responsibility, it must also provide sufficient flexibility to allow
the administrators to benefit from experience. Whether reform should take the
pattern of general provisions for responsibility as exemplified in § I2a of the
New York Court of Claims Act, or more detailed and specific provisions as
embodied in a draft statute proposed by Professor Edwin M. Borchard4 6 is
problematical. While the former has the apparent advantage of flexibility and
makes possible the development of rules of community liability in the light of
cumulative experience, the latter has the advantages of certainty and definiteness and of having its provisions based on the studies of experts. Further, as
previous experience in Illinois has indicated, broad and general provisions
might enable the courts by the device of strict construction to defeat legislative
attempts to extend responsibility.
The major problems47 in the reform of the present state of the law are:
Ill. L. 1931, p. 454; Ill.
State Bar Stats. 1935, c. 38, §§ 540, 541, 543. "They appear to
142

be based on the view that such a horrible occurrence as a lynching or mob violence either implies fault in protective agencies or, on the theory of equitable distribution of risks, should be
borne by the community." Borchard, op. cit. supra note 98, at 97.
143 Ill.
State Bar Stats. 1935, c. 24, §987 (i).
'44 Borchard, The Federal Tort Claims Bill, i Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1933).
14S N. Y. L. 1929, c. 467, § x2a.
x46 Borchard, State and Municipal Liability in Tort, 2o A.B.AJ. 747, 750-52, 793-94 (1934).
147Among the other problems of reform, Professor Borchard lists: (i)Should existing
statutes dealing with responsibility be left on the statute books or should a "comprehensive
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(i) to determine the extent to which the principle of community responsibility is
to be adopted in view of the experimental stage of reform and in view of the
political and financial difficulties of securing legislative adoption; and (2) to
decide upon specific administrative machinery to give practical effect to any
reform which is finally adopted.4 s While France has advanced to the stage in
community responsibility in which liability without fault has been imposed in
some cases,' 49 the objective of the English and American reform movement has
been to achieve state accountability but limit it to the tortious invasions of employees and officers acting within the scope of their employment.I5 ° Abolition
of the distinction between governmental and non-governmental functions, accomplished by some European countries,'1' should be achieved by any proposed
reform.
The proposed draft statute provides that "the state, and every county, city,
municipal corporation, school district, district established by law, and other
political subdivision of the state shall be liable" for injuries to property up to
$25,ooo 52 and for personal injuries and death up to $7,500.1S3 Such injuries must
be proximately caused by "the wrongful or negligent act or omission" of an
employee or other agency of the state or its subdivisions. 5 4 Claimants are defeated by contributory negligence, or when the damage or loss is proximately
caused by intoxication or wilful conduct of the claimant. The fact that the
injury arose out of the conduct of a governmental function, however, is not
made a defense.ss Because of political expediency and caution dictated by the
experimental stage of community responsibility, the draftsman has not only
restricted the amount of recovery, but has limited the situations in which a
claim against the state can arise., s 6 Hence, injuries to prisoners and National
Guardsmen do not give rise to claims. No claims are allowed for injuries arising
uniform act be attempted?" (2) Should we deal with the problem of state responsibility independently of the liability of municipalities and other subdivisions of the state? (3)Should
liability insurance be adopted as a solution? See Borchard, op. cit. supra note 146, at 752.
148
The objective of legislation to extend community responsibility is "to reconcile justice
with expediency. Unlimited liability for official delinquency of allkinds might throw on the
community an incalculable burden, so that wisdom in drawing lines of substantive admissions
and exceptions, in providing for simple yet efficient procedure with an eye to financial consequences, in creating responsible administration so as to reduce the risks of official injury and
community loss, becomes the goal of legislative skill in statesmanship and draftsmanship."
Borchard, Recent Statutory Developments in Municipal Liability in Tort, 2 Legal Notes on
Local Gov't 89, 92 (1936).
149
Takayanagi, op. cit. supra note 57, at 292-95; Borchard, Governmental Responsibility
in Tort, 28 Col. L. Rev. 577, 604; 28 ibid., 734, 772-75 (1928).
ISO
Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 Yale L. J. 229, 258 (1925).
151See Borchard, op. cit. supra note 149.
'5 Borchard, op. cit. supra note 546, at 752; § i of draft statute. (Hereafter all section
references are to sections of the proposed statute.)
1S3 §3.
IS4 §§ 1, 3.
SS§ 6.
zs6§ss.
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out of public medical or surgical treatment, assault, excessive force, false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, slander,
libel, battery, misrepresentation, interference with contractual rights, deceit,
or any criminal act. Likewise claims arising from legislative acts or executive
orders do not give rise to liability.
It may well be argued that these exceptions to liability are so broad that
little substance is left to the proposed extension of responsibility. While such
exceptions may be politically expedient, they should be limited as much as
possible. Since injuries to National Guardsmen are at present compensated in
Illinois,57 there would be no need for this limitation. Likewise the exception to
liability with regard to criminal acts should be made more specific, since present
statutes declare so many intentional and negligent activities to be criminal that
the possible scope of the exception is too broad. In view of the apparent state
of political opinion in Illinois, as reflected by the passage in 1935 of a bill intended to extend state responsibility, perhaps legislative approval could be obtained even though some of these exceptions were eliminated. It is to be noted,
however, that the proposed statute extends municipal and quasi-corporate
liability. Likewise, it must be emphasized that the present policy of the court
of claims and the tenor of the governor's veto messagess may indicate a need
for even more exceptions than the draft statute provides.
The draftsman has indicated that a major political and financial difficulty is
presented by the limited sources of revenue in the small subdivisions of the
state. s9 These subdivisions might well object to the imposition of tort liability
and defeat the legislative adoption of the proposed statute. The suggested solution is a distribution of this burden of responsibility between the state and the
local subdivisions.' 6° The subdivisions needing assistance would contribute
2 per cent of their gross tax receipts to the state; and the state would assume
all liabilities under the act. 5' Claims against those local subdivisions whose
liability the state had not assumed would be paid out of their local funds.162
The suggested administrative implementation for the assertion and disposition of claims has as its objectives: (i) the maintenance of local autonomy as
much as possible by not transferring "from local units to a centralized state
board all tort claims, but to leave both the appointing power and some responsibility with the local units, while yet distributing the financial burden in
S7Gayles v. State, 8 Ct. CI. (IIM.) 299 (I934); Hayes v. State, 8 Ct. CI. (Ill.) 459 (1935).
158Veto Messages, op. cit. supra note 73, at 31, 9o.
"9 Borchard, op. cit. supra note 146, at 751-52. The draftsman suggests that subdivisions
with a gross tax revenue of less than $25oooo are within this class.
x6o
The justification for this distribution is that most claims arise in connection with highways, the greatest use of which is not local.
161
To encourage more efficient government, the draftsman suggests that unexpended portions of the contributions should be periodically returned to the subdivision. Borchard, op.
cit. supra note 146, at 751-52.
162§ 2.
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such a way that the local unit would not bear too great a burden"; 63 and (2)
the settlement of claims under $2,5oo by administrative bodies and the disposition of claims above $2,5oo by the court of claims only upon failure of an attempted settlement by administrative means. This is open to a possible objection. While the settlement of small claims by administrative bodies might be
desirable after definite rules of responsibility have been developed, before such
rules have been developed such administrative disposition might be erratic.
The draft statute provides for a state administrative board in addition to the
court of claims. This board is to supervise and attempt to make uniform the
administration of the act. The board is also to hear and adjust all claims of less
than $2,5oo against the state and against those subdivisions which have not
established "a board, council, body, or officer authorized to settle private
claims."' 6 4 Claims of less than $2,50o against local subdivisions are to be heard
and adjusted by local boards and councils. 6s Where a claimant objects to the
adjustment made by a local board, he may, if his claim amounts to more than
66
$2,500, submit it to the court of claims.
During the litigation in the court of
claims, the state board may settle the claim for less than $2,500.67
While the draft statute provides for an appeal to the supreme cofirt of the
state, it is clear that under the present constitution of Illinois no such provision for appeal would be constitutional.168 How to obtain a court of claims, a
state board, and local boards which will be independent of political influences
presents a more difficult problem than securing a capable judiciary. This problem would be intensified in Illinois by the absence of an appeal to the supreme
court. Perhaps the publicizing of the dispositions of claims by the state and
local boards would supply at least a partial solution to this problem.
Again to insure political success to the proposed reform, it is suggested that
the legislature should establish a "general fund" out of which awards under
$i,ooo which have been made by the court of claims and the state board 69 shall
be automatically paid. ° The legislature, however, must approve all awards in
excess of $i,ooo.17, This latter provision for a legislative and executive check
on the court of claims and the state board may be politically expedient to facilitate the adoption of the draft statute. Yet the policy of the present governor
7
in Illinois to review the individual awards made by the court of claims1 2might
146, at 751.
64§ 2.
However, awards made by the small units, whose liability the state has assumed,
may be reviewed and revised by the state board. § io of the draft statute. The draftsman's
proposal to have the awards made by all of the local subdivisions subject to the approval of
the state board will aid in obtaining uniformity in substantive rules. Likewise, local political
influences may thereby be checked.
63Borchard, op. cit. supra note

16S§ 2.

166§ 9-

x67§ 9.

168See note 74 supra.

9 Awards

made by the board or council of the subdivisions whose liability the state has
assumed are subject to the same provisions.
170§ 2. This would avoid executive and legislative check on small awards.
172Veto Messages, loc. cit. supra note 73, at 3o-31.

17 § 9-

NOTES

seriously hinder the proper and efficient administration of the act and prevent
the development of the desired system of state accountability.
Various supplemental provisions deny the subrogation of insurance companies to the claimants' rights, and provide that a deduction shall be made from
the claimant's claim equal to the amount which he has received from insurance
companies.'73 Juries are eliminated174 Excessive attorneys' fees are discouraged by criminal sanctions.'7- Redress for claims in excess of $25,000 is still
X
to be obtained by legislative appeal. 76 Assignments of claims are prohibited 77
The state is to pay only its proportionate share of the damage caused by its
agent and a joint tortfeasor.178 Short periods of limitation are established.'79
The exaggeration of a claim or the presentation of false evidence "with intent
to defraud" bars the claim."' ° To encourage more efficient public service and
yet not to impose too heavy a burden on public employees, the proposed statute
provides for governmental redress from employees or officers, but only for
"wilful" tortious invasions.1'' While this provision departs from the view
taken by the common law,8"2 it is in accord with modem justifications for
vicarious liability of the private employer.1"'

MANUFACTURERS' LIABILITY-McPHERSON v. BUICK
COMES OF AGE
Cutting across the general problem of protecting the pocketbook of the consumer' is the problem of protecting the person of any member of the public,
whether consumer, user, or bystander from injuries due to defects in chattels.'
There have been two distinct judicial approaches to this latter problem: the
'73 § 6.

X7S§

18.

177 § 7.

179

§§ 5, 8, 14.

174 §

8.
76 § 20.
"'8 § 12.
ISo § ig.
17. It is suggested that employees should not be free from ultimate liability in cases
where there is "gross" negligence amounting to reckless conduct.
182At common law, the agent was liable for negligence in performing his undertaking. See
Mechem, Agency §§ 1274-8o (2d ed. 1914).
181§

"'3 Douglas, Vicarious Liability and the Administration of Risk, 38 Yale L. J. 584,

720

(1929).
I Soule, Consumer Protection, 4 Encyc. Soc. Si. 282 (1931); Hamilton, Caveat Emptor,
3 Encyc. Soc. SCl. 28o (193o). Organizations such as Consumer's Research and Consumer's
Union send informative periodical bulletins to members. In addition, significant attempts are
being made to utilize the mass buying power of the consuming public through consumers cooperatives. Such non-legal means as these go far toward solving this problem.
2No
less than eighty cases in tort alone have appeared in the appellate reports since 1928;
in New York alone there have been sixteen cases in this interval. When the cases tried on
warranty theory and the high percentage of all such cases that are tried in lower courts or
settled out of court are also considered, the practical importance of the problem is clear.

